Justin Holcomb, Responding to Carl Trueman- Christianity Is NOT A Metanarrative

Editor’s Note: Justin Holcomb is a regular Contributor to CGO but I want to acquaint readers who might be new to CGO to Justin’s work. Justin was with me at Reformed Theological Seminary, where he earned two MA degrees, and then he earned the Ph.D. in religious studies at Emory University. For two years, he was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center on Religion and Democracy at the University of Virginia, and he has remained at UVa as a Lecturer in the Religious Studies and Sociology departments. He is ordained and in the local parish has a vibrant ministry preaching and training men who are preparing for ministry. Last year, his edited volume, Christian Theologies of Scripture, was published and he is currently working on another volume that clarifies and explains post-modern terms and their relevance for theology.

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          In his review of Brian C. Stiller’s book Preaching Parable to Postmoderns, Carl Trueman writes: “But here’s the rub: Christianity is metanarrative. To fail to set the parables within the metanarrative of the Christian story may be the reader’s choice.”

          Actually, here’s the rub: Trueman uses the term “metanarrative” incorrectly in his claim that Christianity is one. Trueman is not alone in his misuse of the term; multiple theologians in various Protestant communities committed to historic orthodoxy misuse the term. My goal is not to arrogate myself by lacerating a faithful brother about a fine semantic point. I value the work of Trueman and others in thinking theologically about the challenges to the Gospel in our time. Rather, in the hopes that we can follow Paul’s admonition that “knowledge puffs up but love builds up” I hope to make a modest contribution, in love, to our thinking about Christianity, narratives, and metanarratives. My critique of Trueman and other Christian theologians’ use of metanarrative admittedly concerns an academic debate, but because the term metanarrative has spilled out of academic confines and into a slightly broader public, it seems worthwhile to engage in this modest critique.

          In this post, I want to argue that since Christianity does not fit the definition of a metanarrative as described by Lyotard it is incorrect to claim that “Christianity is metanarrative.” If Christians knew what a metanarrative is, then they would not argue that Christianity is one.

          Christians tend to defend metanarratives because they have a faulty understanding of what a metanarrative is and then they defend the Christian faith as a metanarrative. Ironically, this is an argument that is actually a critique against the faith and the opposite of what Christians intend to communicate. They want to defend the faith from challenges that would reduce it to being just one among many human constructions, but in calling the Christian faith a metanarrative this is exactly what they are doing. In the end, arguing that Christianity is a metanarrative sounds confused. The Christian faith is a narrative; but it is not a metanarrative in the technical use of the term.

          In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard analyzes postmodernism by looking at the status of science, technology, and the arts, the significance of technocracy, and the way the flow of information and knowledge are controlled by the Western world. He writes: "I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse and making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. For example, the rule of consensus between the sender and the addressee of a statement with truth-value is deemed acceptable if it is cast in terms of a possible unanimity between rational minds: this is the Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero knowledge works toward a good ethico-poitical end- universal peace…Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives."[1]

          The term “metanarrative” is used by Lyotard to describe the way in which narratives (popular stories, myths, or legends) bestow legitimacy on social institutions (politics) and legitimate a certain type of knowledge (scientism) and knowing (positivism). For Lyotard, the hero of the Enlightenment metanarrative uses his or her reason to “work toward a good ethico-political end—universal peace.”[2] With its sanctification of reason, the Enlightenment narrative privileged technological progress and personal advancement and created the illusion that human potential and happiness was unlimited. All one had to do was free oneself from superstition (religion) and the world would be a better place. Modernity has, correspondingly, emphasized individualism, personal power, and autonomy. In spite of the promise of modernity, however, the wars, famines, poverty, and inequality of the modern world have made it all too obvious that the end result of the Enlightenment’s goal to alleviate the miseries of the human condition applies only to a small portion of the population. In this respect, the contradiction between the universality of the Enlightenment project and its application to a minority of the population lies at the heart of many of the critiques of modernity.[3] Lyotard’s claim in The Postmodern Condition is that metanarratives serve those who propagate and defend them.

          It appears almost self-evident that the excesses of the modern world are the dangers that emerge from a free-spirited secularism, and postmodernism is a response to and outworking of this modernist experiment. Lyotard defines postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” In response to this, some theologians have understood this to be a critique of the contextualizing nature of God and God’s revelation and they, not knowing the implications of their claims, have argued to defend metanarratives.

          Metanarratives are legitimizing narratives of the world and the place of inquiry in it. According to Lyotard, our epoch has witnessed the collapse of the grand metanarrative schemes of Kant, Hegel, and Marx that once promised truth, hope and, justice at the end of inquiry. What we are left with is an open multiplicity of incommensurable language games, each disposing of its own immanent criteria. This presupposes that we should not presume to judge any one discourse according to the standards, values, or truth-conditions of another, but should instead seek to maximize the current range of “first-order natural pragmatic” narratives.

          A characteristic of modernity, according to Lyotard, is its reliance on “metanarratives” for the legitimation of both science and the state. Metanarratives take many forms, “such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.”[4] However, Lyotard isolates two basic types, representative of both of the main strands of post-Enlightenment thought: the “narrative of emancipation,” implicit in modern science and in the politics of the French revolution, and the “speculative narrative” of Hegelianism.[5]

    According to Lyotard, faith in these metanarratives has been shaken by far-reaching developments in both society and culture. He adopts the notion of “post-industrial” society to refer to a society dominated by a mode of production in which knowledge and information technology play a central role. The cultural and intellectual counterpart of this social form is a postmodern culture, characterized by “incredulity toward metanarratives.”[6]

          Lyotard’s postmodern diagnosis has a clear critical edge. It can be seen as one more response to the catastrophes of the twentieth-century history. Totalitarianism demonstrates the dangers of totalizing thought that attempts to bring all discourses and thought into harmony with the goal of Enlightenment social utopia and positivism. Certain strands of postmodernism seek to disrupt all forms of discourse that encourage the totalitarian suppression of diversity. The incredulity toward metanarrative is born out of the opposition to the rationalistic reduction of the “other” to sameness.

A metanarrative is not merely an over-arching meaning or belief rooted in a transcendent order. It is the opposite. Over-arching meanings and beliefs not rooted in a transcendent order are human constructions, the edifices of modernity. Metanarratives are over-arching meanings and beliefs, but for the purpose of legitimizing autonomous humanity, validating the modernist “views from no where” and supporting the “myth of neutrality.” When we use meaning to legitimize ourselves, our desires, and our autonomy they have constructed a metanarrative. Do we still want to claim that “Christianity is metanarrative”?

          In defense of universal truth, some Christians equate “metanarratives” with universal values. But this is the opposite of what metanarratives are. They are non-universal views masking and parading as if they are universal. They are “willing to power”—not because they contextualize, but because they have no business contextulizing. Metanarrative are merely human constructions masking as universals. They contextualize to legitimize.

          A metanarrative is not simply a big-story, but a big-story that legitimates autonomous humanity. The problem postmodernists have is that they have not seen a narrative do anything else but legitimate itself and lead to an oppressive universality that totalizes. The reason postmoderns challenge metanarratives is because metanarratives are simply human constructs.

          Surely Christians do not want to make the claim that Christianity is merely a human construct or just a perspective. The claim that Christianity is a metanarrative would result in reducing the Christian message to solely an attempt to “will to power” and legitimate ourselves and our supposedly constructed religion. This is the opposite of what Christians should be defending, and when they use the term “metanarrative” to refer to the Christian faith this is exactly what they are saying whiling trying to argue the opposite.

          In case this post appears to be nit-picking about semantics and the use of one word, there is an important point that needs to be made. “Semantics” are important. Some theologians are engaging in a discourse and misusing a term that has an established conventional use. If the term “metanarrative” is going to be used then it should be used properly. If theologians are going to call Christianity a metanarrative then they need to understand the implications of that statement. In the rush to defend the faith against relativism some have confusingly and mistakenly called for the rejection of the postmodern rejection of metanarratives. They critique the postmodern critique of autonomy.

          The Christian faith is not a metanarrative. A metanarrative is a narrative that locates and legitimizes itself autonomously. Yes, Christianity does place all other discourses within a mastering design or story, which grounds their meaningfulness. But “grounding meaningfulness” does not make it a metanarrative. Meaningfulness is a benefit or narratives, but problems arise when the narrative legitimates itself and humanity, a humanity that is fallen, fragile, and broken. The problem is not that the narratives interpret or contextualize, but when they do so in a reductionistic, rationalistic, and positivistic manner. They do so, ultimately, in an autonomous manner and pretend to have a view from nowhere.

          Merold Westphal argues that in philosophical discourse, “meta” signifies a difference of level and not primarily size (“mega”). He writes: “A metanarrative is a metadiscourse in the sense of being a second-level discourse not directly about the world but about a first-level discourse.”[7] However, the proclamation of the Christian gospel and its enactment in sacraments is a first order discourse—it is kerygma, it is proclamation, it is participation, it is repetition. It is not a human-made philosophical system to legitimate our desires, politics, or epistemology. A metanarrative is a second order discourse as a reflection on all other discourses, much in the sense of the systems of Marx and Hegel. A metanarrative’s task is to legitimate the project and practices of modernity, specifically regarding science (knowing) and the state (society). Lyotard’s target is not Christianity but rather autonomous humanity defending itself.

          The teachings of the Christian gospel do not come from philosophy but from the prophets and apostles, from revelation. They come from without and beyond human constructions and judge “us.” The critique of metanarratives was made way before Lyotard; it was made in the Bible, especially its injunction against idols. The purpose of modernity’s metanarrative was to legitimize modern humanity and defend against critics. To defend metanarratives is to rebuild the Tower of Babel.

    The Christian faith is prophetic and calls “us” into question and offers a teleology in which whatever we are involved in is questioned and judged. We should be suspicious of narratives that legitimize us. Theologians should agree with Lyotard when he challenges metanarratives, because metanarratives are the tools of idolatrous intentions of autonomous humanity. The incredulity toward metanarratives is the challenge of human totalizing schemes and involves the decentering of the self from the knowledge process. Challenging metanarratives challenges anthropocentrism and autonomy.

          Theologians should appreciate the desire to magnify the Christian declaration of the gospel to be more than just one among many other human constructions of reality. But claiming its metanarrative status is not the way to do so. Calling Christianity a metanarrative actually reduces the claims of Christianity to a mere human construction.

          “Metanarrative” in the strictest sense refers to the several master plots—of the progress of Spirit, emancipation, or science—by which the Enlightenment legitimates itself. Christianity, of course, does not spring merely from the human imagination nor does its history begin in the eighteenth century and it is not self-legitimating. For Lyotard, the term “metanarrative” does not simply refer to a “grand story” in the sense of stories which have grand or universal pretensions, or even make universal claims. What is at stake is not the scope of these narratives but the nature of the claims they make. Given this more precise definition of metanarratives, I urge that the revelation of God in Christ and scripture is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense. Metanarratives are a distinctly modern phenomenon: they are stories which not only tell a grand story, but also claim to be able to legitimate the story and its claims by an appeal to universal Reason.[8]

          Perhaps one should distinguish between “metanarrative,” which corresponds to the kind of gigantic, totalizing metaphysical systems and their corresponding practices that typify modernity, and some other term, such as “macro-narrative,” which might be used to describe the Christian narrative insofar as it bears many of the formal properties of other narratives and yet transcends them by virtue of being grounded in the sheer mystery of Jesus Christ. We might regard the Christian “macro-narrative” as both grander and more modest than modern, humanistic metanarratives.

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[1] Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

[2] Ibid., p. xxiv.

[3] For more see Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry,” in Dialectic of the Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1972), pp. 120-167. Also see J. Habermas, “Modernity Versus Postmodernity,” New German Critique 22 (Winter 1981).

[4] Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiii.

[5] Ibid., p. 37.

[6] Ibid., p. xxiv.

[7] Merold Westphal, Overcoming Ontotheology (New York, Forham University Press, 2001), p. xiii.

[8] James K. A. Smith, “A Little Story about Metanarratives: Lyotard, Religion, and Postmodernism,” Faith and Philosophy 18:2 (April 2001), p. 354.

Comments

[Vicky]

Justin, thanks for clearing this up for readers. I agree with you that semantics are, in fact, vital, and I also believe that my Christian faith is not based on a construct. So here's my question: do you think there are constructs that have arisen within Christian religion? apart from, or loosely connected with, or even derived from the basic truths of faith? How do you find the boundary between religious constructs and actual Christianity? I have been pondering all this for quite some time, and I'd be interested in your views.

~Vicky

[Justin]

Vicky,

Yes, I think there are constructs that have arisen in Christianity. Your questions are where the issue is. One difficulty is in determining what exactly is included in the Christian narrative. I am referring to the Christian faith as described in the classic creeds of the tradition. This represents the basics of “Christian theism” or what C. S. Lewis called “Mere Christianity.” As you noticed some difficult questions will remain. Would Roman Catholicism, Greek Orthodox, Dispensationalism, or Calvinism be considered meta-narratives? Or would they just be different systems of the same core narrative structure? Personally, I think there are numerous expressions of the Christian faith that act as metanarratives and are used to legitmitize human autonomy. My warning not to turn Christianity into a metanarrative follows from Luther's impulse in criticizing "theologies of glory."

Back to your question. On the one hand, Christianity proffers a vision of literally everything—God, creation, humanity, redemption, and consummation. On the other hand, this vision unfolds by means of a revelatory language filled with paradoxes (such as the unity and plurality of God or the humanity and divinity of Jesus) and characterized by an analogical form of reasoning that places strict limits on what can be said of the divine. So, it seems that Christianity both is and is not a “grand narrative.” It depends, ultimately, on how we define the term and its range of applications. In any case, the final point is that we may have to concede, even when we get our terms straight, that the line between “meta-narratives” and other forms of narrative is a blurry one. Posed as a warning—does the proclamation of the Christian gospel, if it is to be genuinely proclamation, not carry with it the danger that it will become the kind of legitimizing narrative that Lyotard wants us to reject?

Justin

[joel hunter]

Excellent work, Justin. It is difficult work to persuade someone that their grasp of a set of issues is fundamentally erroneous when they are utterly convinced otherwise (I do not mean to suggest that this applies to Dr. Trueman; I only refer to my own experiences). I hope this post gets the thoughtful consideration it deserves. May it lead to much wisdom.

[Tariq Khan]

Justin,

Thank you for a very well thought out article.

I think that there are metanarratives that are somewhat timeless, but most seem to be linked to a certain period or thought process that eventually ends, for example those that you discussed in the following paragraph:

"A characteristic of modernity, according to Lyotard, is its reliance on 'metanarratives' for the legitimation of both science and the state. Metanarratives take many forms, 'such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.'[4] However, Lyotard isolates two basic types, representative of both of the main strands of post-Enlightenment thought: the 'narrative of emancipation,' implicit in modern science and in the politics of the French revolution, and the 'speculative narrative' of Hegelianism.[5]"

If metanarratives are seen to be often or even sometimes limited to a period, by calling Christainity a metanarrative do we not also err by suggesting that Christianity, a timeless truth, is limited to a period?

[justin]

Joel,

Indeed it is difficult work. This is exactly what my next book project is-- getting some clarity on important terms and concepts from critical or pomo theory and then thinking about the implications for theology.

Justin

[Justin]

Tariq,

You made a really good point here that I didn't think about: "If metanarratives are seen to be often or even sometimes limited to a period, by calling Christainity a metanarrative do we not also err by suggesting that Christianity, a timeless truth, is limited to a period?" I think you are correct...we would err in that way by calling Christianity a metanarrative.

Can you explain what you mean by timeless truth? I'm guessing that your point is that Christianity is true for all times and all places. I'm trying to figure out why you use "timeless" especially when Christianity is all about Incarnation, redemptive history, and God acting in time and space.

Justin

[Tariq Khan]

Justin,

My mistake. I can see that my word choice was poor. God does work in time and space. I agree wholeheartedly with the incarnation of Jesus Christ and redemptive history as recorded in the Bible.

The point I was trying to make in a clumsy manner was that since the resurrection we have seen many metanarratives, many of which are attached to specific and relatively short periods of history. Christianity is not a metanarrative, and to call it one, to me, would liken it to these temporary constructs. In trying to make my point I confused it by referring to "timeless". I should not have done so, and withdraw that part (I was thinking about the word of God being eternal, but that truth does not really fit into this line of reasoning).

[Chong]

Justin,

Very thoughtful article. I have two comments. First, I’m wondering if your reaction to the description of Christianity as a metarrative is a bit harsh. Christianity is not merely a human construct—to be sure. But are all metanarratives necessarily human constructs? Or is that part of the postmodern criticism? If metanarratives are simply defined as all-encompassing, grand stories about life, then the Biblical story certainly would qualify. God created the world, allowed the proliferation of sin, set apart the Jews, established a system of laws, spoke through the prophets, came in human flesh, saved the world from sin, established the church…all with the ultimate goal of ushering in a new heaven and a new earth. Obviously, we believe that this story is not a human construct because it originated with God and reflects the true state of affairs. But I don’t see why it cannot be a metanarrative, even a second order discourse or reflection of all other discourses.

Second, and completely unrelated to my first comment, I wanted to point out an amusing article that I read in the Los Angeles Daily Journal. The article, “Darwin is Everywhere, Human History Shows,” was written by David Brooks and originally appeared in the New York Times. Brooks writes, “…it occurred to me that, although we postmoderns say we detest all-explaining narratives, a newish grand narrative has crept on us willy-nilly and is all around. Once the Bible shaped all conversations, then Marx, then Freud, but today Darwin is everywhere.” Brooks goes on to write, “The logic of evolution explains why people vie for status, form groups, fall in love and cherish their young. It holds that most everything that exists does so for a purpose. If some trait, like emotion, can cause big problems, then it must provide bigger benefits, because nature will not expend energy on things that don’t enhance the chance of survival. [¶]Human beings, in our current understanding are jerry-built creatures, in which new, sophisticated faculties are piled on top of primitive earlier ones. Our genes were formed during the vast stretches when people were hunters and gatherers, and we are now only semiadapted to the age of nuclear weapons and fast food. Furthermore, reason is not separated from emotion, and the soul cannot be detached from the electrical and chemical pulses of the body. There isn’t even a single seat of authority in the brain. The mind emerges (somehow) from a complex light show of neural firings without a center or executive. We are tools of mental processes we are not even aware of.” He concludes with: “Looking at contemporary America form Jerusalem and from the ancient past, it’s clear we’re not a post-modern society anymore. We have a grand narrative that explains behavior and gives shape to history. We have a central cosmology to embrace, argue with or unconsciously submit to.” I’m not sure if Brooks is using the idea of metanarrative correctly, but I thought the article was too good not to share. Sorry for taking up so much space.

[Alan]

Justin:

If Christianity is not a metanarrative, does Lyotard have a category for it? Or does he even conceive of a theory that is neither mute beyond the borders of its own community nor implicated in the evils common to metanarratives?

Say you asked Lyotard: "is Christianity a metanarrative?" How would he answer? Would he construe a contemporary presentation of the Christian faith (say by a standard non-pomo-aware conservative evangelical) as a metanarrative? Surely he wouldn't say, "Oh no, Christianity's not a metanarrative. It's grounded in the mystery of Christ."

[Timo Fary]

JH:
I'm trying to wrap my head around this. So folk like Lyotard are skeptical of grand narratives that appeal to universal transcendent propositions. So your concern would be that we not knee-jerk and run to the defense of (and thus align ourselves with) the category simply because we hold to our own set of universal truths (as if truth needed us to defend it.) Grand narratives make a claim to universals, but Redemptive History, of which all other histories are sub-sets, transcends the meta-narrative. So if Lyotard wants to chase windmills.. Let him? Am I on track?

Wings and Sinatra,
-T