Which Differences in Interpretation Undermine the Authority of Scripture?

Mark Dever posted a piece yesterday in which he writes, "Well then" you might say "why don't you leave this issue of complementarianism at the level of baptism or church polity?  Surely you cooperate with those who disagree with you on such matters." Because, though I could be wrong, it is my best and most sober judgment that this position is effectively an undermining of--a breach in--the authority of Scripture. As Lig the paedo-baptist has often said "If there were a verse in I Timothy saying 'I do not permit an infant to be baptized . . .' we wouldn't be having this conversation about baptism!  There is such a verse about women serving as teacher/elders!"  (Bold face emphasis mine, not Dever's.)

(Read the whole post here.)

I respect Dever a great deal-- he's very bright and he is very well read. He's a pastor-theologian who continues to apply his mind to scholarship. For the academically inclined who might disdain Dever's two masters’ degrees from two evangelical seminaries, his BA is from Duke and his DPhil is from Cambridge. 

His post raises questions for me: what differences in interpretation are allowable within the bounds of orthodox Christianity and why (or on what basis is the determination made?)?

A year ago, Dever's friend and colleague in many enterprises (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, the Southern Baptist Convention and Together For The Gospel), wrote a post about theological triage.  This is what Mohler wrote about first-order and second-order differences in doctrinal issues.

These first-order doctrines represent the most fundamental truths of the Christian faith, and a denial of these doctrines represents nothing less than an eventual denial of Christianity itself.

The set of second-order doctrines is distinguished from the first-order set by the fact that believing Christians may disagree on the second-order issues, though this disagreement will create significant boundaries between believers. When Christians organize themselves into congregations and denominational forms, these boundaries become evident.

Second-order issues would include the meaning and mode of baptism. Baptists and Presbyterians, for example, fervently disagree over the most basic understanding of Christian baptism. The practice of infant baptism is inconceivable to the Baptist mind, while Presbyterians trace infant baptism to their most basic understanding of the covenant. Standing together on the first-order doctrines, Baptists and Presbyterians eagerly recognize each other as believing Christians, but recognize that disagreement on issues of this importance will prevent fellowship within the same congregation or denomination.

Mohler goes on in the article to write that women's issues in the church are second order. I.e. Christians can hold a difference of opinion on these subjects and still be in the bounds of orthodoxy.

Dever is under no obligation to agree with Mohler's blog post from last year, but they seem to me to be saying different things. If I read Dever correctly-- and I may mis-read him, so I'm hopeful for gracious correction if someone in the know can speak to this-- he is saying that if one interprets the Scriptural data on women's issues in a way that results in an egalitarian or feminist perspective, one's interpretive method is an attack on Scripture.

I'm not understanding how interpretive methods that yield differences of opinion on other issues receive a tacit blessing (i.e. Dever doesn't think they are attack s on Scripture) but an interpretive method that yields the wrong answer on THIS issue is an attack on the authority of Scripture.

If my reasoning is faulty-- and it often is-- please graciously point it out. As I see it, based on how I read Dever's post:

1) either the women's issue has been elevated to a first-order issue (you must subscribe to a complementarian position or you are outside of orthodoxy) and he is appropriately insisting that rejecting the correct interpretation means one is not a Christian,

2.) or else he is illegitimately saying that a difference of interpretation on a second-order issue is "an attack on the authority of Scripture."

3.) or a third option: that the women's issue remains a second-order issue, but Dever cannot see that any interpretive method that yields an egalitarian position could be faithful to Scripture. I.e., regarding all other acceptable differences of interpretation of second order issues, Dever can 'bless' interpretations that he disagrees with as being acceptable.  For example, regarding paedobaptism, Dever can study the interpretive method that yields a paedobaptist conclusion and hypothetically say, "I disagree with this but the method is acceptable and is not an attack on Scripture."

But any interpretive method proffered thus far that yields an egalitarian conclusion is not and cannot be a legit method.

I think that is what Dever is saying. I may be wrong and again, I invite correction.

As readers probably surmise, I find options 1 & 3 implausible, and thus I am inclined to option 2, that Dever is illegitimately asserting that a difference of interpretation on a second-order issue constitutes an "attack on the authority of Scripture."

I would need to see it spelled out how the interpretive methods on other second-order issues are acceptable whereas methods that yield egalitarianism are exceptional as attacks on the authority of Scripture.

I write all this as one who respects Dever a great deal and consider him, via our one meeting, a friend. In our one encounter he was exceedingly gracious to me and I have much to learn from him in years to come. I'm grateful to him for his life and ministry, not just his kindness to me. It is possible to read public documents like his blog post, disagree in humility and love, and have a fruitful public dialogue with CGO readers.

Comments

[Kristine]

Without commenting on whether he's right or wrong, I read Dever's post yesterday and read his argument distinguishing (by way of example) infant baptism and women's roles as one of how clearly it is spelled out in Scripture. He reads Paul's admonition, "I do not permit a woman to teach," as a very clear statement on a specific subject; whereas no such clear statement prohibiting infant baptism appears in Scripture. I thought his argument was that since it is so clearly spelled out in Scripture any attempt to rationalize our way out of or around it is a denial of Scripture, based more on the seemingly unequivocal statement by Paul than on the basis of doctrinal hierarchy.

[Glenn]

Kristine,
I read Dever's post the same way. The question-- which you explicitly say you don't want to comment upon-- is whether Dever's assertion about the clarity of the complementarian position is correct or not. If 1 Timothy 2:12 were the only text in Scripture that speaks directly or indirectly to the issue of women, that assertion would be more plausible.

When one considers differing understandings of the nature pre- and post-lapsarian humans, the nature of the Curse, and the nature of Christ's work vis-a-vis that curse, not to mention other passages such as Galatians 3, 1 Corinthians 11 and 14, one can appreciate different ways of putting all these texts together.

Add to that the scholarship that skilled and faithful exegetes like Gordon Fee have rendered in dealing with Paul's first letter to Timothy in its own right, the picture moves from stark, unequivocal clarity to one that has at least a degree of ambiguity.

[Davy Stephenson]

Why must everything fit into a "first order" or "second order" system?

Surely, women's issues are not essential to salvation. But the NT seems to address women's issues much more specifically and certainly than mode of baptism. Dever's point is made that Paul specifically forbids a woman to have authority over a man but nowhere speaks specifically to forbidding a mode of baptism. There is more certainty to women's issues than mode of baptism.

Seems to me that he is saying, that a lot more hermeneutical gymnastics must be done for women's issues than mode of baptism that potentially do undermine the authority of Scripture.

All scripture is God-breathed, so whether it's first, second, third, or fourth order is irrelevant. Inerrancy and infallibility don't just refer to the essentials of salvation.

Some doctrines can be clear without being essential. Essential does not equal clear. Adam was the first man, but that doesn't mean believing in Adam as the first man is essential for salvation but denying that Adam was the first does undermine the authority of Scripture.

Dever does not see women's issues as a matter of interpretation so it is consistent with his "best and sober judgment" for him to assert that the issue of complentarianism is an undermining of the authority of Scripture.

Davy

[Glenn]

Davy,
Thanks for the comment. Your suggestion that not everything be rendered in 1st, 2nd, etc orders gives me something to ponder. Thank you.

You close by writing, "Dever does not see women's issues as a matter of interpretation so it is consistent with his "best and sober judgment" for him to assert that the issue of complentarianism is an undermining of the authority of Scripture."

You may be correct about this as well, but my hunch is that Dever considers all Scriptural topics as matters of interpretation. When we deal with words, we deal with meaning, and when we deal with meaning we deal with interpretation. I'm open to hearing counter perspectives, but it seems to me that we cannot escape interpretation on any communication.

[Davy Stephenson]

Glenn,

I appreciate your gracious response and I understand your well spoken point that all words deal with interpretation. I agree that we cannot escape interpretation on any communication (just ask my girlfriend). But not all words are equally or unequally interpretable. There are levels of certainty of interpretation.

I could be wrong, but it seems that Dever is asserting that women's issues are more clear than mode of baptism (but not essential for salvation).

Is the statement "Jesus is the son of God" set in the context of Scripture a highly debatable matter of interpretation (except maybe for the council of Nicea)?

"Is God's truth knowable?" seems to be the larger question you are raising with your statement of interpretation.

Davy

[Glenn]

Davy,
And in turn, I thank you for your gracious demeanor in this discussion. I realize some who might see this will mock because they prefer their discourse more barbed, but I am grateful for your humility and your perspective.

The way you sum it up-- Dever seems to think the women's issue more clear than the disagreements on baptism-- I think an appropriate summary. I suspect he'd say "Yes," that you have gotten to the heart of what he was writing in the T4G post.

If you're asking me if "Jesus is the son of God" is highly debatable matter of interpretation for those of us in Christ and submitted to the authority of Scripture, I give a resounding "No!"

And if you're asking me if I think God's truth is knowable, I would say, "To the extent that He has revealed Himself specially in His Son and in His Word, and generally in Creation, I would say He and His truth are knowable."

I would qualify that statement further, though, and say that as finite, fallen creatures we apprehend His truth adequately, but not exhaustively. I suspect you and I would agree that an infinte Being would be required to know the truth of an infinite Being. Thus, we are disadvantaged with respect to a comprehensive knowledge but because of His gracious gifts in imago dei faculties, common grace, the Son, the Spirit and the Word, we are able to apprehend adequately His truth.

[Paul]

Recognizing there are people much more learned than I involved in the present conversation, and noting upfront that I have tremendous respect and affection for Mark Dever (a fellow -- and much more distinguished -- Duke grad), with respect I need to say I am not comfortable with his diagnosis. So -- I may be completely wrong.

First, I am uncomfortable with the assertion that what Paul meant in writing "I do not permit a woman to teach" is plainly obvious. (I agree that in the past this issue has been associated with a rather irresponsible hermeneutic, e.g., "Paul just got it wrong here, and we now know better" -- that is not what I would advocate). What is obvious to one is not to another, and at least some of this is shaped by our locatedness in history and creation. Other points "plainly obvious" are simply not so obvious (believer baptism, literal six days of creation, the rapture, the morality of slavery, "this is my body" (Luther v. Calvin v. Catholicism), "render to Caesar"). There is tremendous need for humility (because of our fallenness and tendency to rationalize, because of our ignorance and distance, because of our high calling to unity and love).

Second, I disagree that, had Paul written "I do not permit an infant to be baptized" we would not be having this conversation. In the hypothetical circumstance we would be put in the same position as the present -- namely a position in which a statement by Paul seems directly contradicted by both the practice of the early church and things which he commends elsewhere. In fact, we would be discussing whether what Paul said there was to a specific congregation at a specific time and place reacting to a specific circumstance, or whether he was laying down a command. If the latter, we would be wrestling with how this fit with the seeming parallel between OT circumcision and NT baptism and how it fit with what seemed the implicit practice in the early church (just as here we are wrestling with how the same Paul could be commending Phoebe as a "diakonos" (Romans 16:1-2), commending Priscilla who teaches Apollos (a man) (Acts 18:26; Romans 16:3) and then say he does not permit a woman to teach.) There are multiple ways out of both tensions (the hypothetical and the real), but it is unfair to pretend the tension is artificial. We look for our answer not to one passage in isolation but to the whole counsel of scripture.

Finally, while the previous generations deserves great respect and deference, we must constantly test their positions -- and our own-- against the counsel of scripture. Semper reformanda does not mean that newer is always better, but it does mean we are constantly being reformed as the Spirit continues to shape Christ's church through his word. The church has had the humility to deal with tremendous "blind spots" of the past (slavery, civil rights) -- this may be such a situation again. It may not. I am fully aware it is dangerous to suggest such a thing -- this line of thinking plainly can be abused -- but an argument against abuse is not an argument against use (or the church would have abandoned its teaching on grace long ago).

In short, I think there is space for orthodox believers of good will to disagree reasonably on this issue and remain in fellowship.

Finally, I would strongly recommend Stephen Holmes' scholarly book, Listening to the Past, and especially his treatment of Baptism in chapter 7, as worthwhile reading to put this discussion in context(noting that the early church did not consider baptism an issue over which to divide fellowship even though differences plainly existed).

That said, I have not made up my mind where I stand on the underlying issue, but I am uncomfortable saying that believers of good will cannot disagree on this issue under the authority of Scripture. Finally, I agree with Mark Dever that there are issues more central to the gospel. But I do not agree that disagreement on this issue undermines the authority of Scripture.